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The Convergence of the Continental 
and the Common Law Model 
of Criminal Procedure 
Craig M. Bradley* 
Reviewing: 
Phil Fennell, Christopher Harding, Nico J6rg, and Bert Swart 
(eds.), Criminal Justice in Europe: A Comparative Study. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995, 404 pp. 
T here are two main approaches to criminal procedure in most of the world: the inquisitorial and the accusatorial. In the inquisitorial 
model, a theoretically neutral judicial officer conducts the criminal 
investigation and a judge (or a panel of judges), who has full access to 
the investigation file, determines guilt or innocence. The trial is a 
relatively brief and informal affair conducted by a presiding judge 
without a jury; the accused oes not necessarily have a right not to testify 
and, until recently, neither counsel had much of a role. This civil law 
system is, to a greater or a lesser degree, the norm throughout continen- 
tal Europe. 
The accusatorial model, by contrast, starts with a police investiga- 
tion that is openly not neutral but rather, at least after it has focused on 
a suspect, is aimed at collecting evidence that will prove his guilt. Then 
an adversarial trial is held before a neutral decisionmaker, judge or jury, 
James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, 
Indiana, United States; A.B., University of North Carolina 1967; J.D., University of 
Virginia 1970. 
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who has no prior knowledge of the case. The attorneys conduct the 
trial, with each side attempting to convince the decisionmaker of the 
rectitude of her position. This common law system prevails in Britain 
and its former colonies, including Australia, Canada, and the United 
States. 
Each system has certain advantages and disadvantages. The 
continental model has the distinct advantage of being much more 
efficient han the common law approach. The pretrial investigation is, 
at least in theory, more neutral, with the examining magistrate using the 
resources of the state to uncover all the evidence, wherever it may lead. 
A jury need not be selected and the trial is conducted expeditiously by 
the judge, rather than by the opposing parties (though, nowadays, there 
is more room for attorney questioning and arguments than in the past). 
Because the system works quite efficiently, plea bargaining is not 
necessary to reduce the caseload, and in continental countries this 
practice is circumscribed. I That is, in the usual case, the prosecution 
must establish the defendant's guilt through the presentation of 
9 testimony, even though, following that presentation, the defendant may 
choose to confess. Similarly, witnesses at trial, including experts, are 
witnesses of the court, not of the parties, and are questioned in a way 
that is designed to produce balanced, rather than biased, testimony. 
But these very advantages contain inherent weaknesses. If a 
defendant does not have a vigorous advocate who is prepared to examine 
the evidence solely from the defendant's point of view, then there is a 
greater chance that an innocent person may be convicted simply because, 
on the most obvious view of the evidence, he appeared to be the likeliest 
suspect. There is something too cozy, to one raised in the adversarial 
tradition, about an examining magistrate passing along a file, which sets 
forth a detailed case for the defendant's guilt, to her judicial colleague at 
the trial court. We are not comfortable, specially in the United States, 
where distrust of government is mother's milk, with a system in which 
government officials determine guilt with little input from the 
defendant's advocate, and none from ordinary citizens on a jury. 2 
1 See in)@a note 44. 
2 "Americans tend to equate inquisitorial systems with coercive interrogation, 
unbridled search, and unduly efficient crime control." Abraham Goldstein, Reflections on 
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The adversarial pproach, with its trial by combat aura, seems 
more fair to us. Each side is represented by a committed advocate, 
fighting to the rhetorical death for his cause, with the final decision 
rendered, not by faceless bureaucrats, but by a commonsense consensus 
of the defendant's peers. Every piece of the government's case, which is 
vigorously presented by the prosecuting attorney, is with equal vigor 
contested by the defendant's lawyer, with only the fittest evidence 
surviving. The inherent hostility that every government official feels 
toward those accused of crime is displayed openly and challenged, rather 
than operating sub silentia gainst the defendant. Since this system 
mistrusts the government, he defendant is endowed with an entire 
quiver of rights that she may launch against he government at various 
stages of the proceeding, including rights against unreasonable s arches, 
to silence, to counsel, and to confront witnesses against her. 
But this combative approach also contains inherent weaknesses. 
For one thing, the prosecution typically has greater esources than the 
defense, including a professional police force to carry out investigations 
and a whole legal department ofwell-paid prosecutors who are generally 
skilled and enthusiastic. The defendant, by contrast, is likely to be 
represented by a court-appointed attorney or public defender, who will 
have few investigative r sources, who may be overworked and underpaid, 
and who will probably believe that his client is guilty. (Obviously, belief 
in the defendant's guilt may affect the performance of a privately 
retained attorney but, one suspects, to a lesser extent.) Thus, despite 
defense counsel's tance of vigorous resistance to the prosecution's case, 
he may, for various reasons, not have his heart in it. 
Even more troubling, in their efforts to advance only the view of 
the case most favorable to their side, the attorneys may skew the truth- 
finding process. The attorney who is most skilled at choosing afavorable 
jury, at arguing to the jury, at locating witnesses, and at examining and 
cross-examining them is more likely to prevail, regardless of the 
defendant's actual guilt or innocence. 
Finally, and most disturbing, this system, with its jurors who 
must be first induced to serve and then persuaded of the defendant's 
Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes inAmerican Criminal Procedure, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1009, 
1018 (1974). 
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guilt or innocence, and its detailed procedural rules (to ensure fair play), 
is extremely cumbersome. Given the limited resources available to the 
criminal justice system and the high cost of jury trials, 3the majority of 
cases must be resolved without a trial. 4 Instead, the system induces 
defendants o give up their rights and plead guilty, frequently by offering 
to convict them of lesser crimes than they supposedly committed, thus 
disadvantaging both the defendant and society. 
In fact, the plea bargaining system is even worse than it appears 
on its face, because the weaker the prosecution's case, the more likely it 
is that a favorable bargain will be offered to the defendant. But 
"weakness" in the prosecution's case also correlates with innocence of the 
defendant. Thus, innocent defendants will, on average, be pressured 
more strongly than guilty ones to plead guilty (by highly favorable plea 
offers) .5 
The differences between the Anglo-American and the continental 
system have begun to diminish. 6 Defense lawyers now play a more 
prominent role on the continent, and suspects have more rights for those 
lawyers to protect. 7 Though jury trials remain in disfavor on the con- 
3 But see Albert Alschuler, Implementing the CHminal Defendant's Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931 (1983) (arguing that 
for about $850 million more than was then being spent on the criminal justice system, 
every defendant could be given a 3-day jury trial). 
4 The National Center for State Courts found that in 13 jurisdictions urveyed, 
the percentage of felony cases resolved by jury trail ranged from a low of 2.1 in Texas to 
a high of 6.9 in Alaska. Jeffrey Abramson, We, The Jury298 (1994). 
5 For an interesting discussion of this problem, compare Robert Scott & William 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1948-49 (1992), with Stephen 
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Yale L.J. 1979, 1981-83 (1992). 
6 On convergence b tween the United States and Germany, see Richard Frase & 
Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law R~orm: Similar 
Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 317 (1995); see also Craig 
Bradley, The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution 95-143 (1993) (discussing how 
various common law and civil law countries are moving toward a U.S.-style, rights-orient- 
ed approach to rules governing criminal investigation). 
7 On recent changes in France, see Stewart Field & Andrew West, A Tale of Two 
Reforms: French Defense Rights and Police Powers in Transition, 6 Crim. L.F. 473 (1995). 
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tinent, 8 a right against self-incrimination at trial, and against involuntary 
confessions, is now generally enforced, and the Netherlands has even 
adopted an exclusionary rule for evidence gained through illegal entry of 
the home by police? Miranda-type warnings l~ are also generally required 
on the continent. 
By contrast, while inquisitorial systems have become more ad- 
versarial, many of the examples of movement in the English (and the 
U.S.) system toward the continental model are, as will be discussed, n 
more in the realm of proposal than of fact. 12 Nevertheless, the overall 
trend is in the direction of a common middle. 
The extent of convergence between the two models of criminal 
procedure is the overarching theme of Criminal Justice in Europe. This 
study calls on English and Welsh law, 13 on the one hand, and on Dutch 
law, on the other, to show the extent to which, in a wide range of areas, 
the common law and civil law systems are becoming more alike. Since, 
as noted above, each system has its strengths and weaknesses, any such 
thorough treatment of how various matters are handled under the two 
s Jury trials were used in Germany between 1890 and 1920 and in the 
Netherlands from 1811 to 1813. Nico Jtirg et al., Prosecutors, Examining Judges, and 
Control of Police Investigations, in Criminal Justice in Europe 227, 229 (Phil Fennell et al. 
eds., 1995). Jury trials have also been abandoned in Japan and India, and are used in- 
creasingly rarely in England. Stephen J. Adler, The Jury at xv-xvi (1994). 
9 Nico J/Srg et al., Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging?, in
Criminal Justice in Europe, supra note 8, at 48, 54. Germany also has a limited 
exclusionary rule, but it depends more on balancing the nature of the evidence against 
the seriousness of the crime than it does on the way in which the evidence was obtained. 
Craig Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1032, 1048 (1983); 
Frase & Weigend, supra note 6, at 334. 
A practice imported from England. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486-88 
See inj~a text accompanying notes 33-37. 
12 "Worries about he partisan ature of policing have led to calls for the introduc- 
tion of a pretrial truth-finder such as the investigating judge." J/Srg et al., supra note 9, 
at 49. Other "proposals include greater judicial involvement in indicating sentences and 
regulating deals." Id. at 52. 
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models represents an extremely valuable guide to how criminal procedure 
reform may be achieved not only on both sides of the North Sea but on 
both sides of the Atlantic as well. 
The book's nineteen chapters examine subjects ranging from the 
general topics of criminal justice in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, to specific topics such as treatment of juveniles and mentally 
disordered offenders. As such, the entire book will be of great interest 
to very few readers, but anyone interested in any aspect of comparative 
criminal procedure will find some part of this book to be an invaluable 
resource. 
Criminal Justice in Europe begins unpromisingly with an essay by 
Constantijn Kelk, complaining enerally that Dutch criminal aw has lost 
its "humane" aspects and has become too "instrumental." That is, the 
Ministry of Justice "remains obsessed with extending the Prison Service 
as far as possible, which is what our punitive society seems to want. ''14 
While one might agree with these sentiments if concrete xamples were 
offered, or if opposing arguments were presented and refuted, this essay 
" has the air of preaching to the choir. It will be convincing only to 
readers who already share Kelk's views. 
The book's second essay, "The Evolution of Criminal Justice 
Policy in the UK," by Gavin Dingwall and Alan Davenport, is much 
more informative. Dingwall and Davenport describe the mushrooming 
crime problem in England 15 and its effect on recent developments in
criminal procedure) 6 In general, as crime rates went up in the postwar 
years, society demanded, and received, longer prison terms for offenders 17 
14 Constantijn Kelk, Criminal Justice in the Netherlands, in Criminal Justice in 
Europe, supra note 8, at 1, 19. 
15 In 1950, 500,000 crimes were reported to the police; in 1991, 5.4 million. 
Gavin Dingwall & Alan Davenport, The Evolution of Criminal Justice Policy in the UK, 
in Criminal Justice in Europe, supra note 8, at 21, 21. 
1~ Presumably, the Netherlands has experienced a similar growth in crime, which 
has influenced the developments that Kelk, supra note 14, criticizes. 
17 Between 1960 and 1979, recorded crime in England and Wales rose by 177 
percent and the prison population rose by 45 percent. Dingwall & Davenport, supra 
note 15, at 2~'. On the recent leveling off of crime rates, see Madeleine Sann, Docu- 
ments Received, in this issue of Criminal Law Forum, at 495, 505. 
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and increased investigative powers for police. However, since the early 
nineties, in part because of the sheer cost of the prison system, and in 
part because harsher sentences were not producing less crime, Is alterna- 
tives to incarceration have increasingly been sought. Dingwall and 
Davenport merely report these trends without criticizing or supporting 
them but, in this limited venture, the essay provides a useful background 
to the comparative discussions that follow. 
Of greatest interest to me were the third chapter, "Are Inquisito- 
rial and Adversarial Systems Converging?" by Nico J6rg, Stewart Field, 
and Chrisje Brants, and the eleventh, "Prosecutors, Examining Judges, 
and Control of Police Investigations," byJ6rg, Field, and Peter Alldridge. 
These two essays, co-written by contributors representing the Nether- 
lands and England and Wales, add extremely significant building blocks 
to the growing edifice of comparative criminal procedure literature. 
Until recently, the narrow attitude in the United States, 
encouraged by the Supreme Court, was that the continental system 
depended upon the use of terror and torture suggested by its namesake, 
the Spanish Inquisition. In a famous passage from Murphy v. Water~ont 
Commission of New York Harbor, 19 the Supreme Court described the 
Anglo-American privilege against self-incrimination asfollows: 
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble 
aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of 
crime to the cruel triIemma of self-accusation, perjury or 
contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an 
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incrimi- 
nating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and 
abuses . . . .  20 
is Dingwall & Davenport, supra note 15, at 31. 
19 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
20 Id. at 55; accordCutombe v.Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961) (emphasis 
added) ("This principle [against self-incrimination], branded into the consciousness ofour 
civilization by the memory of the secret inquisitions, sometimes practiced with torture, 
which were borrowed briffTyj~om the continent, during the era of the Star Chamber, was 
well known to those who established the American governments."). 
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The notion that an "inquisitorial" system of justice was inextricably 
linked to torture and unreliable results, combined with Americans' 
traditional ignorance of other languages and cultures, and the elimination 
of states as "laboratories" due to the national uniformity of criminal 
procedure rules enforced by the U.S. Supreme Court, meant that 
Americans really had no sense of alternatives to the classic common law 
system. The U.S. adversarial/jury s stem, while often unpopular, is 
nevertheless generally thought o be the only fair way to proceed. 
For example, I and, I'm sure, most of my contemporaries 
managed to pass through three years of law school without ever finding 
out that jury trials do not occur in criminal cases on the European 
continent. One's attitude toward such Supreme Court cases as Williams 
v. Florida 21 and Apodaca v. Oregon, 22 in which the Court held that 
twelve-person juries and unanimous verdicts were not constitutionally 
required, might well be influenced by the knowledge that perfectly 
civilized countries dispense with juries altogether. 
In the 1970s, however, this insular attitude began to change, as 
scholars like Abraham Goldstein, John Langbein, Lloyd Weinreb, and 
Mirjan Damaska began to publish comparative articles in leading U.S. 
law journals. 23 Still, as suggested earlier, there is little in the case law to 
indicate that U.S. judges, and particularly the Supreme Court, have been 
influenced by the comparative material found in the legal iterature: Wil- 
liams and Apodaca, while containing extensive discussions of the English 
roots of our jury system, make no mention of continental procedure. 24
21 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
22 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
23 Abraham Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision i Three 
"Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 Yale L.J. 240 (1977); John 
Langbein & Lloyd Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth"and Reality, 87 Yale 
L.J. 1549 (1977); John Langbein, Comparative Criminal Procedure (1977); Mirjan 
Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A 
Comparative Study, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 506 (1973). However, nearly four decades ago, 
Jerome Hall discussed the importance of the comparative approach in The Fundamental 
Aspects of Criminal Law, in Essays in Criminal Science 159 (Gerhard O.W. Mueller ed., 
1961). 
24 Williams, 399 U.S. at 87-98; Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407-10. Even in the 
1980s, Supreme Court Chief Justice Burger, Judge Malcolm Wilkey of the U.S. Court 
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To a large extent, the differences in crim!nal procedure reflect he 
different fundamental ssumptions underlying the inquisitorial and the 
common law system. In inquisitorial systems, "the state is the benevo- 
lent and most powerful protector and guarantor of public interest and 
can, moreover, be trusted to 'police' itself as long as its authority is 
organized in a way that will allow it to do so."25 In accusatorial systems, 
by contrast, there is "a negative image of the state and a minimalist view 
of its functions. ''26 Thus, the accusatorial pproach to criminal justice 
emphasizes separation of powers and the resolution of a conflict between 
equal parties. 27 These traditions mean that, in the Netherlands, the 
"most salient" feature of pretrial process is 
the degree to which all parties co-operate in arriving at a pre- 
prepared version of [the truth] that is subsequently recorded in 
a case file or dossier as the basis for the coming trial. Profession- 
al investigators employed by the state--police, forensic psychia- 
trists, and scientists--are expected not only to do most of the 
work, but to do it in a detached and impartial way, an assump- 
tion that allows the defence to leave most matters of investiga- 
tion to [state officials]. 2s 
In England, instead: 
Each party is responsible for developing evidence to support its 
arguments. Investigation is motivated by self-interest rather than 
public interest. There is no investigating judge to seek out 
"truth" and, despite official rhetoric about impartiality in 
prosecution, the concrete legal duties of police and prosecution 
lawyers do not extend to seeking out exculpatory evidence. 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and others thought hat "no other civilized nation in the 
world" had an exclusionary ule. Bradley, supra note 9, at 1032. 
25 Jtrg eta]., supra note 9, at 44. 
26 Id. at 45. 
27 IeL 
2s Id. at 47. 
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Indeed, what constitutes truth is subject o negotiation by the 
parties. Extensive plea bargaining simply produces an agreed 
approximation of events . . . .  It is rare for any judicial authority 
to challenge these agreed assertions. 29 
"Prosecutors, Examining Judges, and Control of Police Investiga- 
tions" discusses in detail the different rules governing treatment of 
suspects by the police as a function of the different assumptions 
underlying the two types of criminal justice system. In the Netherlands, 
there are few formal rules and prosecutors see themselves as "magistrates 
. . . engaged in an impartial weighing of the different interests in- 
volved. ''3~ Indeed, for a prosecutor "to be thought heavily oriented to 
crime control [as opposed to due process] is a threat o one's self-image 
and career prospects. TM If defense attorneys are dissatisfied with the 
"integrity of the police file," they can, even after the trial has begun, 
petition the judge to order further investigations upon a prima facie 
showing of inadequacy or illegal obtainment of evidence22 
The Dutch system is moving to some extent toward the 
adversarial model, as noted above, 33 but continues to reflect the basic 
belief that the organs of the state can be depended upon to pursue the 
criminal investigation and the trial fairly. Thus, in the Netherlands, the 
investigating judge may, under fairly broad circumstances, question 
witnesses out of the presence of the defense attorney, and those hearsay 
statements can be introduced at trial in the witness's absence? 4 
Nevertheless, both the police and the prosecutor are increasingly seen as 
29 Id. at 48. 
3o J6rg et al., supra note 8, at 236. 
31 Id. at 237. 
32 Id. at 238, 242. 
3~ See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
34 J/Srg et al., supra note 8, at 239. However, this practice appears to be in 
conflict with the European Convention and thus is likely to change. Annemarieke Beijer 
e~ al., gc~tness Evidence, Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, and the 
Principle of Open Justice, in Criminal Justice in Europe, supra note 8, at 283, 287-88. 
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partisan, with a concomitant recognition that formal rights must be 
accorded to suspects to resist official powerY 
The contributors also suggest that the English system is, in some 
respects, becoming more inquisitorial. However, this "trend" is less clear: 
From an inquisitorial viewpoint the procedural safeguards [of the 
1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act--PACE] look like a 
step towards inquisitorial policing, in that they seek to provide 
guarantees of reliability essential to truth-finding. But to the 
adversarial eye, in the absence of a duty . . . to seek out all 
germane vidence--the changes are seen more in terms of 
equality of arms. Extended powers for the police necessitate 
extended rights for the defence. 36
The reluctance in England and Wales to conform to continental 
procedures i  further exemplified by the fact that whereas in the Nether- 
lands the European Convention on Human Rights is directly enforceable 
in the courts, in the United Kingdom the convention and decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights thereunder lack the force oflawY 
Indeed, in the area of pretrial investigation by police, it is my 
view (the contributors do not make this point) 3s that the adversarial 
35 Jrrg et al., supra note 8, at 239. 
36 Jrrg et al., supra note 9, at 49. 
37 Even though England has been a party to the European Convention since 1966. 
See generally Bert Swart & James Young, The European Convention on Human Rights and 
CHminal Justice in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in Criminal Justice in Europe, 
supra note 8, at 57. The convention is, however, often a subsidiary source of law. Ia[ 
at 62. 
3s Kelk, supra note 14, at 6-7, does point to "diminishing tolerance" in the 
Netherlands, which can "be seen in our attitude toward ethnic minorities," and concludes 
that this trend has contributed to "juridification" (the establishment of formal rules) "not 
because of any deep-seated interest in the classical values of liberty, equality and 
fraternity" but to establish "social control in the sense of supervision and one person 
watching another." I doubt that many Americans would have such a rosy view of human 
nature as to suppose that police do not require some "watching," especially when it comes 
to their treatment of minorities. 
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model, characterized by conviction-oriented police and prosecutors 
checked by aggressive assertion of rights by suspects and their attorneys, 
is the wave of the future. As societies become more diverse (i.e., more 
like the United States), the notion that government can be trusted to do 
right by minority groups seems anachronistic. The more informal 
approach of the continental system may be well suited to a society in 
which everyone is of the same or similar background. But it is not 
suitable where minority groups are mistrusted by, and mistrust, the 
majority and its police forces. In the absence of shared norms, formal 
delineation of rules by courts or legislatures, and their enforcement by 
counsel, are essential. Thus it is no surprise that the development of
Dutch and even to some extent English 39 law governing police proce- 
dures in recent years has been in an adversarial, rights-oriented direction 
as the trend of those societies has been toward greater ethnic diversity. 
Still, some developments in England and the United States, such 
as the requirement that exculpatory evidence be handed over to the 
defense 4~ and, in some states, extensive mutual discovery obligations have 
a decidedly continental tone. 41 
But it is the inquisitorial trial that has the most to offer Anglo- 
American criminal justice, though it is an offer that has not been widely 
accepted. In both the United States and England and Wales, the jury 
trial continues to be much revered, even as it is actually used less and less 
(about 5 percent of criminal cases in both jurisdictions). 42 The process 
39 Bradley, supra note 6, at 96-108. 
40 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). In the United States, at least, 
this obligation extends to impeachment evidence. Id. at 678. However, in neither 
country are the police expected to search out all possibly exculpatory material nor 
necessarily even to hand over such material absent a request by the defense attorney. Id. 
at 681-82; see alsoJ~rg et al., supra note 9, at 49. 
41 Older features of the Anglo-American system such as "an organized police force 
and overt acceptance of police power to detain and interrogate in order to generate 
evidence against the suspect" originated with inquisitorial systems. J~rg et al., supra note 
9, at 48; see also Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1018. 
4: On Britain, see Laura Masnerus, Under Fire, Jury System Faces Overhaul N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 4, 1995, at 9; on the United States, see Abramson, supra note 4, at 252 (cit- 
ing statistics from the National Center for State Courts). 
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is too cumbersome, too expensive, and, in the view of many, too un- 
just. 43 A short, mandatory, 44 non-jury trial in the continental mode, 45 
with few of the evidentiary restrictions that inhere in the usual jury trial, 
is a sensible alternative. 46 
As noted earlier, such trials are conducted by a presiding judge 
who has full access to the file and must justify the decision with a 
detailed written judgment that goes to the court of appeals. Counsel are 
limited to supplementing the judge's direct examination of witnesses, 
cross-examination, a d closing argument. Moreover, the influence of the 
community need not be entirely eliminated, since lay judges can still be 
used, as in Germany. 47 Similarly, the continental model, in which the 
court, not the parties, chooses and then for the most part conducts the 
examination of expert witnesses eems a vast improvement over the 
"battling experts" system that prevails in the United States) 8 Finally, the 
right of  the defense attorney to full access to the prosecutor's file seems 
a worthwhile step away from the trial as sporting event. 
Still, as attractive as foreign models may be, the contributors 
repeatedly and rightly caution that because of the "deep-rooted nature of 
certain national concepts, procedures, and institutions, there may be 
dangers in transposing the approach of other systems without aking into 
account he depth of national tradition and outlook. ''49 In particular, the 
43 E.g:, Masnerus, upra note 42. 
44 Even if the defendant chooses to admit guilt, the presiding judge will still 
conduct a limited trail. Joachim Hermann, Bargaining Justice: A Bargain for German 
Criminal Justice, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 755, 763 (1992). 
45 In Germany, the average trial for less erious criminal cases takes about 2 hours; 
for more serious cases, about one day. Langbein, supra note 23, at 77. A similar pattern 
is documented in Supreme Court of Japan, Criminal Justice in Japan 14 (1987). 
46 Lloyd Weinreb, Denial of Justice 117-64 (1977); Stephen Schulhofer, Is Plea 
Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1037 (1984). 
47 For further discussion, see Bradley, supra note 9, at 1063. 
48 Craig Bradley & Joseph Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and the "Search 
for Truth" in Criminal Cases, S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996). 
49 Christopher Ha ding et al., Conclusion--Europeanization and Convergence: The 
Lessons of Comparative Study, in Criminal Justice in Europe, supra note 8, at 379, 386. 
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career civil servant judges of the continental system may be better trained 
and better able to conduct a trial dispassionately than the elected or 
politically appointed judges in the United States. Moreover, minority 
confidence in determinations of guilt may suffer if judges, rather than 
juries, decide criminal cases. 5~ But, whatever the dangers may be, there 
can be no dispute that greater knowledge of other systems is tremen- 
dously valuable, and it is to this growing body of knowledge that 
Criminal Justice in Europe makes an important contribution. 
50 As would the educative function of widespread citizen participation i  juries. 
However, if lay judges sat in many more and shorter trials than are currently held, the 
total amount of citizen participation might not be much reduced. 
